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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DANIEL LARRY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
Appellate Case No. 20081015 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of Illegal Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of §58-37-8 
(2)(a)(i), and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of 58-37A-5. This court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
1 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILINGS DURING 
THE COURSE OF TRIAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT 
SUA SPONTE SUPRESSING EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM 
A SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not preserved for appeal, but 
should be ruled to be plain error. The Court would then review these prejudicial 
statements under a plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994), this Court held, "Under [the plain error] standard, 
2 
we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error 
was both obvious and harmful". 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i): Prohibited Acts 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§58-37A-5 Unlawful acts 
(l)It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug 
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person 
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (4) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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(5) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this 
chapter. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of 
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining, and the state engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with one count of Illegal 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, and one count 
of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 5) The 
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Defendant was tried before a jury on October 10, 2008, empanelled by the 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan. The jury found the Defendant guilty of all 
charges. On November 18, 2009, the Defendant was sentenced to serve 
concurrent terms of not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison and six 
months also at the Utah State Prison. The Defendant is currently serving this 
term at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia after he was pulled out of the 
backseat of a vehicle following the arrest of the driver. (R. 43) The Defendant 
was a passenger of a vehicle that was pulled over because the vehicle was 
operating without insurance. (R. 43) Officer Francom is the police officer that 
stopped the car. (R. 43) There were three people in the car; the driver, Kendell 
Spanger, and passenger, Michelle, and the Defendant in the driver-side backseat. 
(R. 43, 49) Officer Francom arrested Spangler because of an outstanding warrant 
from Layton P.D. for not having proof of insurance. After taking Spangler into 
custody, Officer Francom ordered the Defendant and the other passenger out of 
the car. (R. 43-44) He then proceeded to search the vehicle. 
After ordering the Defendant out of the car, Officer Francom searched him 
for weapons and placed him into custody. Officer Francom found no drugs, 
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paraphernalia, or weapons on the Defendant. (R. 62) Officer Francom then 
proceeded to search the vehicle for "contraband, weapons, anything that is illegal 
and they shouldn't be in possession of." (R.62) During the search of the vehicle, 
Officer Francom found a pipe used to smoke crack-cocaine which was located on 
the seat where the Defendant had been sitting. (R. 44, 53) Officer Francom then 
took the Defendant into custody, handcuffed him behind his back, and called for 
an officer from the narcotics strike force to transport the Defendant to jail. (R. 
67). Officer Francom later found another crack pipe on the seat of his patrol car. 
(R. 61) Officer Grogan of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force arrived on 
the scene shortly thereafter and transported the Defendant to jail in his patrol car. 
(R.67) After arriving at the jail, Officer Grogan got out of his patrol car to secure 
his firearm in the trunk. (R.69) Officer Grogan then removed the Defendant from 
the vehicle. (R. 69) Officer Grogan then found two small pieces of crack-cocaine 
on the seat of his patrol car. (R. 69). After finding the pieces of cocaine, Officer 
Grogan searched the Defendant and found a burnt piece of steel wool in his jacket 
pocket. (R. 69) 
The jury convicted the Defendant of all charges. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The overriding issue on appeal is that the Defendant was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. This ineffectiveness was manifest at numerous 
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stages of the trial. First, counsel was apparently unaware of the fact that police 
officers cannot search a vehicle after arresting the driver for a non-violent 
offense. (See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (April 21, 2009)). 
The police can only search a vehicle if there is a reasonable cause to believe that 
their safety is at issue. Counsel admitted during the trial that he felt the police had 
the right to search a vehicle after the driver has been arrested. The driver was 
arrested for a non-violent offense, and the police had no reason to suspect there 
were weapons or contraband in the vehicle. No motions or objections were ever 
filed against this unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court allowed this 
evidence to be presented to the jury without conducting a Rule 403 analysis. 
After the Defendant was removed from the car, he was arrested for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, even though no physical evidence was found on 
his person. It was not his car. Counsel never even questioned why the Defendant 
was arrested when no physical evidence was found on him at this point. All of the 
evidence from this search was admitted into evidence. Counsel never attempted to 
object to their legality or file any motions to suppress the evidence. 
Finally, the cumulative effect of these errors and defective representation 
resulted in prejudice to the Defendant and undermined the fundamental fairness 
of his trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILING DURING 
THE COURSE OF TRIAL. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting, "The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) 
Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of 
counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance" (Id. 
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at 688), it did mention certain minimal requirements. Additionally, the 
overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's 
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.55 (Id. at 688) See also 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) 
and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 
2003) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this 
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment 
violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. The Court 
held that, "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate 
tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is 
satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993).) 
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In several recent memorandum decisions,1 the Utah Court of Appeals has 
reversed cases based on obvious ineffective assistance claims. In the recent 
memorandum decision of State v. Scuderi, 2004 WL 2821676 (Utah App.), 2004 
UT App 464, the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose counsel had 
failed to move to dismiss under the Utah Speedy Trial Statute when it was clear 
the case had not been brought to trial within the 120-day limit. In the case of State 
v. Nelson, 2004 WL 2610521 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 421, the Court reversed 
the conviction of a defendant whose counsel failed to file alibi notices on two 
material witnesses for the defense. This failure was held to meet both prongs of 
the Strickland test and required reversal. In the case of State v. Bleazsard, 2004 
WL 2250908 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 351, the Court of Appeals reversed, on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a conviction obtained where the defense 
attorney failed to notify the state of two witnesses who would have testified as to 
the alleged rape victim's prior false claim of rape against one of the witnesses. 
In the reported case of State v. Ison, 2004 UT App 252, f 23, 96 P.3d 374, 
the Court again addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial 
counsel failed to move to admit into evidence a previous finding by an 
Administrative Law Judge that contained admissible exculpatory evidence. The 
1
 While defendant recognizes the Court's caution in use of memorandum 
decisions, these cited cases demonstrate the obviousness of some Sixth 
Amendment failings. 
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Court further found trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's 
instruction to the jury that was incorrect. 
In State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f 13, 999 P.2d 1, Justice Durham, in a 
concurring opinion noted: 
This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been 
recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 
442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case), 
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we 
may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and 
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual 
prejudice" 
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any 
observer. His failure to object to and have a hearing on the seizure and 
subsequent illegal search of the Defendant clearly showed a deficiency. In 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, infra., the court found reversible error in a case where 
trial counsel realized a Fourth Amendment issue, but brought it to the court's 
attention in an untimely manner. That untimely motion alone constituted 
reversible error. In State v. Gallegos, infra., the Court found error in trial 
counsel's failure to renew a previously denied motion to suppress. In the present 
case, counsel, as in Kimmelman, failed to make a timely motion to suppress a 
Fourth Amendment violation. However, unlike counsel in Kimmelman or in 
Gallegos, trial counsel in the case at bar was so deficient that he never even 
recognized that a Fourth Amendment question was at issue. 
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Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial ... suggests no better 
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." (Kimmelman) To the 
contrary, there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to 
make a pre-trial motion to suppress this evidence. Since this motion should have 
been brought prior to trial, even the possible fear of somehow prejudicing the jury 
would be non-existent obliterating any claim that there could have been a trial 
strategy in not raising this issue. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is, "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
14 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective, 
the appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or 
have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Id. 
Likewise, in the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), the court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission 
of a tin canister that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In 
that case the court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to 
the State's case on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was 
obviously prejudicial to defendant." 
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire 
evidentiary picture". If trial counsel had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the 
trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained after such 
violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the 
evidence that supported defendant's conviction. This prong would therefore 
require an analysis as to the constitutionality of the search and seizure in the 
present case. This claim will be more fully argued and supported in point II 
below. 
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When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT 
SUA SPONTE SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
FROM A SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as 
Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant 
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated" The 
Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a seizure is 
unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) held: 
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 
274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected. 
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The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the case 
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court set forth a 
three-prong test in determining whether an individual is seized and what type of 
search is permitted under various types of seizures. 
In the recent case of State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002), the 
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on 
permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as 
follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-
coercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 
U.S. at 498-99. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. 
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 915 
F.2d at 1407 (noting a level-two encounter is an investigative 
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. 
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences ... 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a 
crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention without 
consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. 
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A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. IdL 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2001) reversed a defendant's conviction where he was stopped in a 
public bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that the defendant had 
committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested and a search revealed a 
controlled substance. The Court determined that a reasonable officer under the 
circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
defendant had committed an offense therefore the seizure was unconstitutional. 
In further defining when a stop crosses the line from level-one to level-two, 
the Court, in the case of State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), stated: 
The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual 
encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable 
suspicion) depends on whether, through a show of physical force or 
authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is restrained. 
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 
In State v. Valdez 68 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Utah App. Ct. 2003), the court was 
presented with a case where the police officers were executing an arrest warrant 
on an individual. That individual requested that the officers allow her to go into 
her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing. The officers 
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accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they discovered a 
male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands obscured from the 
officers view. The officers, in an attempt to insure their safety, woke the 
individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet proceeded to 
request his identification. The defendant originally told the officers that he did 
not have any identification; and then, when asked, proceeded to give the officers a 
false name. Upon discovering that the false name and been given, the officers 
arrested the defendant; and in a search incident to arrest, discovered 
methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all the evidence, and the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a holding as follows: 
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual basis to 
disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers' investigation 
into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial court further 
found that no articulable facts existed to support a reasonable 
suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal activity. 
Therefore, Robinson's request for Valdez's identification, or, absent 
that, information concerning his identity, exceeded the scope of the 
reason justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily expanded its 
duration and scope. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly 
suppressed any evidence gathered from that point forward. (Id, at 
1059) 
In the present case there is simply no reason for the officer's actions in 
first, requiring the Defendant to leave the vehicle; second, handcuffing the 
Defendant; and third, performing Terry Frisk of the Defendant. It is informative 
to note that the driver of the vehicle was originally pulled over for no insurance 
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on the vehicle and subsequently arrested for another no insurance warrant. There 
is absolutely no reason for an objective reasonable officer to believe that there 
were any drugs, or weapons in the vehicle. There was no reason for the officer to 
detain the Defendant, place the Defendant into handcuffs, and conduct a Terry 
Frisk of the Defendant given those circumstances. This is precisely the type of 
case that screams out to a trial judge that there has been a significant violation of 
a defendant's constitutional rights. 
In the case of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) the police officer 
searched the vehicle after smelling a strong odor of marijuana after making a 
traffic stop. The officer found a large quantity of marijuana after making the stop. 
The Supreme Court ruled that police can search the passenger compartment and 
of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of a recent 
occupant's lawful arrest—on the ground that is concerned the scope of a search 
incident to arrest. The Court said such searches have long been considered valid 
because of the need 'to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use in 
order to resist arrest or effect his escape' and the need to prevent the concealment 
or destruction of evidence" Id. at 457. Belton, however, renewed the principle of 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, "[the] scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to 
and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. 
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In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) the police came to Chimel's 
home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. When he 
returned from work, police arrested him. Police then asked for permission to 
"look around." Even though Chimel objected, the officers conducted a search. 
They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and 
physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. Police seized 
a number of coins and medals, among other things, that respondent State later 
used to convict petitioner of burglary. The Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction ruling that the search was unreasonable. Absent a warrant, the only 
reasonable place the officers should have searched was the room in which the 
arrest took place. Chimel requires that a search incident to arrest be justified by 
either the interest in officer safety or the interest in preserving evidence. 
A lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the 
contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and 
of the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long been 
considered valid because of the need 'to remove any weapons that 
[the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape' and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence. Id. at 763. 
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Similarly, the case of Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) 
explains that searches incident to arrest are only justified when it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the crime will be found or when the safety of the officers 
are at stake: 
When officer safety or imminent evidence concealment or destruction 
is at issue, officers should not have to make fine judgments in the heat 
of the moment. But in the context of a general evidence-gathering 
search, the state interests that might justify any overbreadth are far 
less compelling. A motorist may be arrested for a wide variety of 
offenses; in many cases, there is no reasonable basis to believe 
relevant evidence might be found in the car. I would therefore limit 
Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Id. at 632 
Perhaps the most relevant and applicable case was handed down by the 
United States Supreme Court just over two months ago, Arizona v. Gant, 129 
S.Ct.1710; 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (April 21, 2009). This is case where Gant, the 
defendant, was arrested for driving on a suspended license. He was subsequently 
handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car. After taking Gant into custody the police 
officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket pocket located in the 
backseat of the car. The Supreme Court ruled that the search violated Gant's 
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court 
held that Gant was simply a comingling of Chimel and Belton: "Accordingly, we 
hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent 
occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior 
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of the vehicle... we conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context 
justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of 
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle." Gant at 1714 
The Defendant recognizes the relatively high bar he must clear as set forth 
in State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994), where this Court held, 
"Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an 
error existed, and that the error was both obvious and harmful". Notwithstanding 
that high bar, the Defendant believes that the obviousness of the facts should have 
made it clear to any trial court that a violation of the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment constitutional rights had been significantly implicated. The 
Defendant was arrested after Officer Francom began to search the vehicle 
Spangler had been driving. There was no reason to assume that the Defendant 
was dangerous or posed a threat to the officer's safety. Spangler was arrested 
because of failure to pay a fine to the Layton Police Department for not having 
proof of insurance, a class B misdemeanor. Officer Francom had no reason to fear 
for his safety because Spangler had already been secured in his patrol car. He had 
no reasonable reason to assume that there was a threat because of the nature of 
Kendall's offense. Not having proof of insurance is not a threat to officer safety. 
Officer Francom certainly did not have the right to search for "contraband, 
weapons, anything that is illegal and they shouldn't be in possession of." (R.62) 
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Aside from his own safety, the only other legitimate reason to search the vehicle 
is to prevent the arrestee from tampering with evidence. Spangler was arrested 
because of an outstanding warrant, therefore there was no evidence to be 
tampered with. 
The Defendant should never have even been ordered from the car. Kendall 
Spangler was arrested because of an outstanding warrant for failure to pay fine in 
another jurisdiction. Officer Francom had no reason to feel threatened or that his 
safety was in question. The arrest was from a warrant and not from any 
immediate offense; therefore there was no evidence to be obtained from the 
vehicle; and as such, there was no justifiable reason to search to perform a search 
incident to arrest. Officer's Francom's actions violated the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, there can be no question that the Defendant did 
not receive a fair trial. The combination of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
the introduction at trial of evidence which violated the Defendant's constitutional 
rights resulted in a conviction that does not meet the standards required by this 
Court. The cumulative effect of the improperly offered and admitted evidence 
and the ineffective assistance of counsel in this case can only be cured by a 
reversal and remand for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM A 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEK 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NOV 2 \ 2008 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DANIEL B LARRY, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071901240 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: November 18, 2 0 08 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 8, 194 9 
Video 
Tape Number: 3C 111808 
PDA 
Tape Count: 312-315 
CHARGES 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/10/2008 Guilty 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA -
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition; 
Class B Misdemeanor 
10/10/2008 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail. Defendant is represented by 
Martin Gravis. The Court hears from counsel and proceeds with 
sentencing. 
071901240 LARRY,DAN!EL B 
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Case No: 071901240 
Date: Nov 18, 2 0 08 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders the sentence imposed on each count to run 
concurrent with each other. The jail sentence shall be served at 
the Utah State Prison. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court orders the defendant receive credit for time served at 
the Weber County Jail from 10/10/08. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
COURTLAND CRAIG JR PRINCE 
CHARLES DANIEL LARRY 
TOM LEWIS 
WILLARD STAWSKI 
CHARLIE LARRY 
CRAIG PRINCE 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
PARAPHERNALIA a C l a s s B 
a t e rm of 180 day(s) 
Dated t h i s day of 
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D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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